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THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE IN GRANTS-IN-AID REGIME
AND CUTS ON GRANTS ON MUNICIPALITIES’ EXPENDI-
TURES IN FINLAND
ABSTRACT: In this preliminary paper the effects of change in grants-in-aid system and grant
cutbacks on the municipalities’ operating expenditures are examined using two panel data
sets: 1986-1992 covering the matching grants system and 1994-1996, covering the new gen-
eral grants system. The paper compares the effects of grants in these two grant systems. The
effect of matching grants system to municipal expenditures is found to be highly stimulative.
The estimations using data from general grant system show that the effect of the grants to op-
erating expenditures is considerably lower than in the matching grant system. This supports
the hypotheses that the change from matching grants system to general grants system and the
cuts on grants constrain municipalities’ propensity to consume the aided services.2
1 Introduction
One common thing to all countries is that there are fiscal disparities among the local level
governments and that the need to equalize these differences exists. Residents of municipalities
with considerably lower tax base or higher than average costs, can face substantially higher
tax burden or lower levels of services than the residents in wealthier municipalities without
central government intervention. The empirical research has often concentrated in defining the
effect of grants-in-aid to municipalities when allocating increases in aid. The concept of fiscal
illusion and the flypaper effect have been been under several studies (see Dollery & Wor-
thington, 1996, for a summary). The flypaper effect means that the categorical lump-sum
grants increase public expenditure by more than an equivalent increase in income from other
sources (Courant, Gramlich & Rubinfeld, 1979). The empirical findings on the whole have
been supporting the flypaper effect hypothesis (Grossman 1990; Marshall, 1991).
On the other hand, the research on the effects of aid cutbacks to municipalities has not been
very common. Nevertheless, in many countries the grants-in-aid have been subject to cuts or
switching from matching grants-in-aid system to general grants system during the past decade
or so (for example Finland and Sweden). Fiscal disparities among municipalities are reduced
if grants to municipalities are allocated so that the municipalities with higher need-capacity
gaps are favoured. On the other hand, if the cuts on grants are executed so that the munici-
palities with relatively weak fiscal positions suffer the most, then the aid cutbacks will in-
crease fiscal disparities. The cutback strategy can be designed so that the weakest municipali-
ties would not suffer too much, but the general result of aid cutbacks is that the fiscal dispari-
ties will increase (Rescowsky & Schwartz, 1990).
Although the subject of aid cutbacks has not been very popular in local government research,
some empirical research has been done. Studying 281 municipalities for the years 1985 and
1990 in Sweden, Aronsson & Wikström (1994) found that when changing from matching
grants-in-aid system to general grants system, the expenditures will be cut sharply,  especially
in the municipalities that have been major beneficiaries. According to Boyne (1990), however,
the negative effect on expenditures is considerably smaller when the grants are cut.3
There has been some research to determine the effect of grants-in-aid and some demographic
variables on the municipalities’ expenditures in Finland (Moisio 1994; Oulasvirta 1996, 107-
125;). In these studies both cross-sectional data was used. The studies showed the existence of
stimulative effect of the grants to municipalities’ expenditures in the old system. In the
econometric models where total expenditures and total operating costs per capita were the
dependent variables, the grants-in-aid per capita got estimates significantly greater than one.
These results proved the connection between municipalities’ expenditures and state grants,
which has been widely discussed in the theoretical local government literature. In this paper a
further attempt to estimate the municipal expenditure model with panel data and estimation
methods is carried out.
The cuts on grants in Finland have not been under research, however. This paper is the first
attempt to define the effects of aid cutbacks and the effects of changing the grants system in
Finland in the traditional grants-expenditures framework. The results presented here are pre-
liminary, as a lot remains to be done with the modelling and econometric analysis of the data
for aid cutbacks. Nevertheless, in this paper an attempt is made to describe the effect of the
grants-in-aid system in Finland during two different grants-in-aid systems, namely the system
in 1980s that was based on matching grants and the present system that is based on general
grants and precalculated costs of municipalities. The stimulative effect of the grants-in-aid
system in Finland in the 1980s and the problems that the present system has inherited from
that time are also discussed.
2  A short history of the municipalities’ role in public sector
and  the grants-in-aid system in finland
2.1  The old grants-in-aid system
The regional administration
i in Finland has traditionally been an integral part of the central
government administration. The municipalities, however, have been rather independent in
their decisionmaking. Since the 1960s the division of responsibilities between the local level
and central government has been clear: local level produces basic services that are decided
nationally and the central level takes care of redistributive tasks and policy formulation. Most4
of the social, health and basic education services have traditionally been organized by the mu-
nicipalities. The enlargement of public sector since the mid-1960s and the political needs for
an equal production of services in different parts of Finland have resulted in the rapid growth
of municipalities‘ economy and personnel (see table 1 below). The enlarged services of the
local government also called for an extensive and comprehensive grants-in-aid system.
The municipal finances in Finland have been based on independent taxation, central govern-
ment grants-in-aid, loans, fees and sales revenues. Municipal income tax is a flat rate tax on
the earned income of individuals and the tax rate is set annually in advance for the following
year in each municipality by the municipal council on the basis of the municipal budget. In
1998 the tax rate varies between 15.0 and 19.75 % according to the municipality, with an av-
erage rate of 17.55 %. The average tax rate has been steadily increasing during the last dec-
ades. Table 2 shows the development of the main components of the municipal finance since
1950:
Since the beginning of the 1970s and until the year 1993 the grants-in-aid consisted mostly of
specific categorical matching grants. In the end of the 1980s 99% of all grants to municipali-




1950 97 000 146 000
1960 137 000 177 000
1970 194 000 187 000
1980 337 000 226 000
1985 400 000 230 000
1990 466 000 216 000
1995 455 000 165 000
Table 2 Municipal finances during 1950-1996
iii
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1996 estimated
Tax incomes 50,8 50,4 54,4 40,2 39,4 40,7 45,0
Loans 11,5 5,2 5,3 3,9 4,5 1,7 2,0
Grants-in-aid 17,5 15,0 15,3 18,2 23,0 28,0 23,0
Other incomes 20,2 29,4 25,0 37,7 33,1 30,6 30,0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 1005
ties were this type. The evaluation of the financial base of the municipalities was also part of
the grants-in-aid system.
iv This evaluation, which was decided yearly by the Ministry of the
Interior, formed the redistributive policy base of the central government. The municipalities
were divided into 10 groups and the higher the group of the municipality the less state support
it received. Each year in the evaluation it was decided which municipalities were risen or low-
ered in the classification. The grants-in-aid system had separate matching grant rates for each
service-category for the 10 classes.
The meaning of the evaluation system was to guarantee a certain financial base for all munici-
palities. Equality among the citizens located in different municipalities was one of the most
important principles in grants-in-aid policy. This meant that the matching rates of the grants
were highest in the municipalities with lowest population densities, lowest tax bases and high-
est tax rates. Of course, this kind of system was effective in redistributing the welfare among
the municipalities as the poor municipalities received aid and the wealthy municipalities actu-
ally financed it. Over the time period 1980-1992 an increasing number of the municipalities
ended up in the lowest 4 groups in the classification, that were getting the largest amounts of
grants.
The system was criticised, however, becouse the evaluation system seemed to handle munici-
palities with similar financial base differently and that it was giving too much weight for the
municipalities that organized the services inefficiently. As the grants-in-aid system was based
almost completely on matching grants, the municipality did not always have to look for the
most inexpensive way to organize the services.
The complexity and variety of the compensation percentages in different services was also
criticised. The system had so many compensation scales for different services, that simply the
administrative problems became quite big. In addition, the problem was also that municipali-
ties were stimulated to opt for policies resulting in higher compensation rates. This was not
always optimal for the grantor’s point of view. Yet another problem from the state’s point of
view was that as most of the grants were matching, it was difficult for the Ministry of Finance
to define the state budget for the following year.6
It is quite clear that the kind of grants-in-aid system that Finland had until the year 1993 and
that leaned mostly on matching categorical grants, was a highly stimulative one. For some
time the stimulation of the municipalities’ services/expenditures was perhaps the meaning of
the system. But in the 1980s the system seemed to have become an automatic expenditure
system that no-one was controlling. Several attempts to reform the system were made in the
1980s, but the basic problems remained. Finally, in the beginning of the 1990s the planning of
a fundamental reform could begin. That reform was implemented from the beginning of the
year 1993. The reform will be briefly discussed in the following section.
2.2  The reform of the grants-in-aid system
One can say that in the beginning of the 1990s the building of the Nordic welfare state in Fin-
land had come to an end. One can also say that due to recession, from the beginning of the
1990s of the state has been forced to actively seek for more effective ways to organize the
public services, both in state and municipal level. In practice the reform of the grants-in-aid
system to municipalities in 1993 meant that most of the grants that the municipalities received
were no longer matching.
Since the beginning of 1993, the grants-in-aid have been based on the so called calculated
expenditures in health, social welfare and education sectors that together form the majority of
the services eligible for state grants-in-aid. The ”calculated expenditures” meant roughly that a
unit cost for each municipal service is precalculated in the associated ministries and then
payed to each municipality after being weighted by the classification of the municipalities and
some special coefficients describing the municipalities financial strength. A new feature of the
reformed grants-in-aid system is also that the system depends more on general grants than
before, when they were only 1-2% of all grants-in-aid. The structure of different types of
grants in the first year of the reform (1993) is described in the table below:7
The meaning of the reform was to simplify the system and to give the municipalities an in-
centive to act cost-effectively. As the new grants are not matching and earmarked like before,
the municipalities are expected to be more encouraged to seek for the most inexpensive meth-
ods to provide the services. Also, if some savings are made in some category, the municipality
can now decide itself how to spend the saved ”extra” money. The table below summarizes the
factors that are used to define the need for state assistance.
Table 4 The factors that are used to calculate grants
THE NEW GRANTS-IN-AID SYSTEM 1993-
Grant The variables and factors used in the calculation of the grant
Social welfare and
health services
- classification of the municipalities (abandoned 1996)
- the age-class distribution
- the parameter describing sickness in the municipality
- the area of the municipality
- population density
- unemployment level.
- special coefficient for small municipalities in the coastal area.
Education and cultural
services
- classification of the municipalities (abandoned 1996)
- number of students
- number of hours of lessons
- population in the municipality
- the percentage of  Swedish speakers
General grants - the classification of the municipalities (abandoned 1996)
- the area of the municipality
- population density
- the percentage of  Swedish speakers
Contribution to the tax
base
- if the municipality’s tax base is lower than 85-95% of the mean level in all municipalities (the
percentage used depends on the municipality’s population density)
Since the year 1996 the evaluation system was abandoned. The redistribution among the mu-
nicipalities is now done by harmonizing the tax base among the municipalities by guarantee-
ing each municipality 90% of the average tax base. This has secured a stable economic base
for the poorest municipalities.




Grants for social welfare and health care 50,5
Grants for education and culture 28,9
Other operating cost eligible grants 3,3
Investment grants 2,4
Total 1008
3  The empirical examination of the two grants-in-aid peri-
ods
vi
In this section the operating expenditures per capita are regressed on grants and some demo-
graphic and economic variables under two different grants in aid systems using panel data
vii,
covering years 1986-1992 and 1994-1996.
 viii The first period contains 455 municipalities and
the latter period consists of 435 municipalities. The main focus in this study is towards the
grants-in-aid effects on expenditures. The results of the other variables below are only briefly
commented.
The dependent variable is operating expenditures per capita (E) (in the latter period the vari-
able is net operating costs). As was already mentioned, the municipalities take care of most of
the education, health and social services, and these also form the largest part of the municipali-
ties‘ budgets. The largest share of the operating expenditures are wages.
The grants-in-aid per capita (GIA) has been a very important component in the municipalities‘
finances for the period 1986-1992 and also for the period 1994-1996. The importance of the
grants for the municipalities has been steadily growing over time (see appendix). After the
reform took place, the economic recession has forced the central government to cut the
amount of grants: from the year 1993 to 1996 the grants to municipal sector decreased by 18,4
percentage points (1993-95 Statistics Finland; 1996 Federation of Finnish Municipalities).
ix
While in the 1980s the central government monitored municipalities’ expenditures by chang-
ing laws concerning the responsibilities of municipalities and by restricting municipalities’
ability to tax, in the 1990s the central government has taken more direct measures such as
cutting the grants-in-aid.
The tax base- variable (T) consists mainly of incomes of the population. The long term loans
per capita - variable (L) has been included in the regressors to be able to see the effect of bor-
rowing in the municipalities` expenditures.
In the grant system also some simple demographic variables were used to describe the mu-
nicipalities` need for state assistance. The selection of these variables was mainly done with-
out extensive research or testing of the actual significance in explaining the cost levels of the
municipalities. It was nevertheless the common belief, that for example the land area (AR) of9
the municipality would desribe the need for assistance, becouse it was expected that the larger
the municipality the harder and more costly it is to provide services for the population. An-
other varible used was the number of inhabitants  (N) in the municipality: the lower the num-
ber of municipality, the higher was the matching rate for grants. To this group belongs also the
population density (PD), that was used in grants system with the expectation that the lower the
figure the higher are the costs. Variable urban (URBAN) describes the level of urbanization
of the municipality
x. This variable is needed becouse the population density may give false
picture: in a municipality with low population and/or large area  most of the people may live
in a small area.
By using the share of socialist representatives in municipal council - variable (S) tests the
left‘s widely assumed political need to create more publicly provided services. As for the age
structure, three different groups were taken into estimations as a percentage of the total popu-
lation, mainly becouse under six years (I6) old children need daycare services that can be
costly to provide, under 14 year olds (I14) is a group that need both the daycare and compre-
hensive school services. Most over 75 year olds (I75) on the other hand need a lot of health
and social services. The unemployment (U) level describes the need for financial support for
families in the municipality.
Due to data availability, the period 1986-1992 was estimated using more variables than the
latter period. The full model is then:
Ei = b0 + b1GIA + b2N + b3AR + b4PD + b5T + b6L + b7Urban + b8I6 + b9I14 + b10I75+  +
b11U + b12S + ui,
where ui is the error term.
4  The results
4.1  Matching grants-in-aid system
This period covered the years 1986-1992. The Chow-test for poolability showed that the beta
estimates of the explanatory variables were not stable over different years.
xi This result casts
serious doubt about the possibility of pooling the data. However while testing heteroscedas-10
ticity
xii and model specification
xiii in the year by year estimations it was discovered that there
is both heteroscedasticity and model specification problem. This can mean that Chow-test is
not necessarily reliable test for pooling. For this reason, the following steps were carried out in
the estimations:
1. The model is estimated using both within- and error component two stage least
squares (EC2SLS)-methods
2. Also the yearly estimations are carried out (see appendix)
3. The results from steps 1 and 2 are compared
The final conclusions are made using steps 1-3
After within and EC2SLS-estimations
xiv it was discovered that for some variables the estima-
tion results differed considerably between these two methods. This could be the result of two
things: firstly it could be that the error component model assumption of no correlation be-
tween the right hand side variables and the error term is not acceptable in this case. Secondly,
it is possible that the model is not correctly specified. If the problem of correlation was true,
the estimates of error component model would be biased and inconsistent.
At the same time, however, the estimates of within-estimation would be both unbiased and
consistent, becouse within-method erases the fixed effects. If one sees considerable differ-
ences in the estimation results between these two methods using Hausman test, it is suggested
in the econometric litterature
xv that within-method should be used. In the Hausman test the H0
means that the hypothesis E(uit|Xit)=0 is true and the opposite hypothesis means that it is not
true. When these tests were carried out using this data the Hausman test rejected the zero hy-
pothesis. This is why the final estimation method was chosen to be within-method (for the
Hausman test results, see appendix table A5). The results of the estimations are shown in ta-
bles 2 and 3. In each table, there are results for three different models: model 1 consists of 14
explanatory variables, models 2 and 3 there are 13 and 12 explanatory variables so that in
model 2 the squared population is removed and in model 3 the under six year olds share is
removed. The squared population is removed becouse it is not significant and share of under
six years old -variable is removed becouse it was necessary to see how the share of under 14
years old-variable would survive on its own.11
In the following the estimation results are commented for each explanatory variable:
GIA (grants-in-aid) had significant estimate larger than one. The results show the stimulative
effect that the grants have had in the period 1986-1992. This result confirms the earlier results
of Oulasvirta (1996) and Moisio (1994) that were estimated with cross-section data. This re-
sult is also supported by studies that have found causal relationship from grants to expendi-
tures.
xvi It can then be that the grants-in-aid system, not the need, has stimulated the expendi-
tures. The average effect has been 1.21-1.25 FIM for each 1 FIM of state grants.
The population (N) has a small positive effect on operating expenditures. The estimate for
population squared (negative) suggests that there could exist nonlinear relationship with the
expenditures. However, this variable correlates quite strongly with population density (0.74)
so it is quite clear that this population-estimate reacts strongly to the removal of population
density.
The population density (PD) is normally expected to have U-shaped relationship with expen-
ditures, since the common belief is that the expenditures are higher both in low and high
population density municipalities. In Finland, there is some research evidence that high popu-
lation density and on the other hand high rate of rural population correlates positively with the
expenditures for different services.
xvii  The PD squared did get significant positive values us-
ing within-method. Therefore it is suggested that the higher the population density the higher
the expenditures. Furthermore, the population density rises the expenditures with increasing
rate.
The tax base (T) and long term loans per capita (L) were control variables in the estimations.
These variables got estimates that described the average tax rate and the expenditures of bor-
rowing in the municipalities expenditures in the municipalities.
Urban - variable has a nonlinear U-shaped effect on expenditures in the panel models. This
variable explains poorly the operating expenditures.12
The share of under six years old population  % (I6) explained operating expenditures very
well. It can then be concluded that the large share of children means higher operating expen-
ditures.
The share of under fourteen years old population %  (I14) got a negative estimate which was
somewhat surprising. It must be concluded at least that this age group does not have an in-
creasing effect on municipalities´expenditures.
The share of over seventyfive years old population %  (I75) increases operating expenditures.
The variable is clearly strongest of the three age group variables.
The unemployment rate (U) does have positive effect on operating expenditures. Unemploy-
ment therefore increases the need for services.
The share of socialist representatives in the council % (S) seemed not to have significant
effect on expenditures. However, according to the coefficients it can be speculated that the
large number of socialists actually decrease the municipalities´operating expenditures.
Table 5 Fixed effects Within-estimation: dependent variable operating expenditures








GIA 1.25 32.31 1.24 32.53 1.21 33.85
N 0.17 1.34 0.10 1.92 0.10 1.90
N
2 0.00 -0.61
PD 7.70 0.38 18.42 2.06 18.51 2.06
PD
2 0.01 1.31 0.01 2.17 0.01 2.14
T 0.16 17.55 0.16 17.90 0.16 18.68
L 0.15 6.74 0.15 6.77 0.15 7.15
Urban -14.58 -1.68 -15.05 -1.75 -12.82 -1.50
Urban
2 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.39 0.01 0.16
I6 156.60 2.47 157.64 2.49
I14 -238.12 -5.83 -238.32 -5.84 -159.09 -6.43
I75+ 214.45 3.20 212.19 3.19 201.33 3.06
U 68.02 9.80 68.42 9.93 70.02 10.37
S -4.16 -0.40 -4.19 -0.41 -3.32 -0.33
constant -566.88 -0.85 -396.30 -0.64 -466.84 -0.75
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.9513
Finally, when estimating the model year by year it was discovered that the economic variables
(grants-in-aid, tax base and long term loans) explained expenditures quite well: the estimates
were reasonably stable over the years and were quite close to the panel estimates. However,
some of the demografic variables got estimates that were either unstable or not significant
over the years.
4.2  The new grants-in-aid system
The period in this model covers the years 1994-1996. The data consists of 435 municipalities
and the dependent variable is net operating expenditures, which means that the expenditures
are net of user fees.
Again the Chow-test rejected the time stability of the beta estimates of the explanatory vari-
ables. The yearly estimates can be seen in the appendix. The Hausman test showed also here
that the correct estimation method was fixed effects model. The repeated testing of poolability
with different models, years and variables resulted one model that passed the poolability tests.
This model was estimated using two stage least squares with lagged grants as instrumental
variable and can be seen in the table below.
Table 6  Fixed effects Within-estimation (with 2SLS): dependent variable net operating
ex penditures
By comparing the yearly regressions with the pooled regression one can see that the GIA es-
timate is smaller in pooled model than the average yearly estimate. Also, the GIA-estimate is
clearly smaller than with the dataset 1986-1992. This result would support the hypothesis that
the change from matching to more general types of grants has resulted in less responsive ex-
penditure behavior of the municipalities.
Coefficient t-value
GIA  .9382585  7.098
AR -7.056596 -2.918
L  .8653654 13.069






On the whole the models estimated did quite well in explaining the total and operating expen-
ditures. The stimulative effect of matching grants in the period 1986-92 was verified. One
explanation to this is that the municipalities have been plainly maximizing the amount of state
aid.
Most of the demographic variables used to estimate the expenditures passed the tests well.
Also, most of the variables got estimates of expected sign. The results show that the greater
the population density and urbanisation, the higher the expenditures. This result is contrary to
the criterion used in the grants-in-aid system, where low population density mean more grants.
The high share of children and old people and unemployment seem to increase operating ex-
penditures. The higher the rate of socialists, the lower are the operating expenditures, this re-
sult is not significant though. The unstability of the estimates of some of the demographic
variables in different years casts doubt on some of the results, however.
The estimations with the new data set showed that the effect of the grants to operating expen-
ditures is considerably lower than in the previous grant system. This supports the hypotheses
that the change from matching grants system to general grants system and the cuts on grants
constrain municipalities’ propensity to consume aided services. The effect of cutbacks could
not be separated from the change of grant system with these estimations, however. A further
study using differences of the variables could perhaps give more light to this issue.
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i The regional administration units consist of 5 provinces, 20 counties and 452 municipalities.
ii Selvitysmiehen raportti kuntataloudesta 1993, 10; Central Statistical Bureau 1996.
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iv The evaluation took place by looking at the municipalities‘ net expenditures and tax incomes per capita, the growth/decrease of population, local tax rate compared to the
average tax rate in all municipalities and some special circumstances creating extraordinary burden to the municipality’s economy.
v Oulasvirta 1996, 163.
vi  Due to space limitations the data summary is not presented in this paper. The summary will be available upon request.
vii Panel data offers certain advantages over traditional pure cross section or time series data. The most obvious advantage is that the number of observations is much larger in
panel data. This is likely to produce more reliable parameter estimates and alleviate the problem of multicollinearity: when the explanatory variables vary in two dimensions
they are less likely to be highly correlated. The use of panel data may also eliminate or reduce estimation bias. See for instance Mátyas and Sevestre 1992, and the references
given there.
viii Statistics Finland 1985-1996.
ix At the year 1990 price level.
x Criterion by Statistics Finland
xi The testing was done using the full model (see below) and the results showed that the F-test values were greater than the 5% significance values so the hypothesis of
b b i =  could be rejected.
xii Cook-Weisberg-test. See for example STATA-manual p. 377 and the litterature mentioned there..
xiii Ramsey RESET-test.
xiv The 2SLS-method was used, becouse GIA-variable is an endogenous variable. Lagged grants-in-aid were used as instrument
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xvi See for example Moisio & Kangasharju (1997) and Dahlberg & Johansson (1996).
xvii See Pyy (1996), p. 29.17
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
A1 Yearly 2SLS-regressions for full model for the old grant system
xvii
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
GIA 1.157 17.897 1.223 17.021 1.186 18.528 1.095 17.689 1.197 19.606 1.173 12.690 1.322 20.290
N 0.019 1.384 0.021 1.386 0.014 0.911 0.018 1.278 0.021 1.179 0.026 1.380 0.002 0.094
N
2 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.457 0.000 -0.011 0.000 1.187
AR 0.037 0.333 -0.006 -0.052 0.094 0.665 0.134 0.829 -0.038 -0.536 -0.012 -0.146 0.033 0.440
PD 3.782 1.483 3.855 1.368 3.417 1.164 3.950 1.390 6.301 1.791 4.936 1.377 7.148 2.030
AT
2 -0.002 -0.906 -0.002 -0.940 -0.003 -0.952 -0.003 -1.039 -0.005 -1.365 -0.003 -0.840 -0.006 -1.700
T 0.149 6.484 0.182 7.184 0.175 7.095 0.179 7.526 0.202 8.314 0.201 5.167 0.260 10.057
L 0.288 5.178 0.211 4.060 0.219 4.289 0.218 4.939 0.247 5.208 0.272 5.603 0.245 6.778
Urban 35.538 2.717 29.183 2.530 20.511 1.577 39.714 2.650 12.685 0.777 -9.801 -0.441 9.687 0.503
Urban
2 -0.009 -0.067 0.075 0.552 0.257 1.719 0.121 0.763 0.238 1.365 0.412 1.968 0.227 1.160
I6 7.779 0.074 -91.381 -0.852 11.554 0.094 2.403 0.019 18.469 0.130 32.942 0.191 -271.915 -1.727
I14 -47.418 -0.752 16.116 0.255 -85.891 -1.268 -39.832 -0.561 -51.013 -0.629 -184.554 -1.671 -86.299 -0.890
I75+ 79.104 1.060 178.399 2.772 153.818 2.153 288.284 4.767 181.668 2.275 -26.639 -0.283 -29.628 -0.388
U 43.280 1.306 85.481 2.127 102.137 2.353 224.621 4.148 199.805 3.197 87.630 1.663 27.741 0.855
S 10.978 1.714 4.609 0.678 -4.530 -0.640 -0.960 -0.128 10.757 1.350 14.360 1.635 11.804 1.402
const. -2116.190 -1.345 -4446.085 -2.663 -2838.725 -1.494 -5381.302 -2.746 -6125.198 -2.544 -834.614 -0.210 -3891.950 -1.439
R
2 0.7494 0.7563 0.7693 0.7929 0.7963 0.7524 0.7545
RESET F(3, 3166) =15.59
Prob > F =0.0000
F(3, 3166) =14.86
Prob > F =      0.0000
F(3, 3166) = 6.75
Prob > F =      0.0000
F(3, 3166) =14.21
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(3, 3166) =12.22
Prob > F =      0.0000
F(3, 3166) = 8.53
Prob > F = 0.0000
F(3, 3166) =10.12
Prob > F = 0.0000
A2 Yearly 2SLS-regressions for full model for the new grant system18
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1994 1995 1996
Coef. t-values Coef. t-values Coef. t-values
GIA   1.779131  3.603   .9827088  14.567   1.022998  10.381
N   .0356934  1.660    .015598   1.773   .0115453   1.258
N2   8.33e-09  0.098  -2.88e-08  -0.949  -2.71e-08  -0.779
AR  -.1490165 -0.582    .103989   1.507   .0635339   1.035
PD    -2.2203 -0.679  -3.423316  -1.929  -.8615291  -0.519
PD2  -.0009839 -0.369   .0012458   1.176   .0003959   0.351
T   .3562331  3.013   .1581834   8.441   .1420741   6.757
L   .0422461  0.577   .0131429   0.391    .027791   0.885
URBAN   4.904643  0.091   19.38541   1.110  -9.759156  -0.757
URBAN2   .0629555  0.142  -.0671058  -0.453    .180314   1.505
U   72.21059  1.671    97.7859   6.023   53.36415   3.629







R2 0.40 0.70 0.71